Communications Security Establishment | Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

Dell VxRail 7.0

3 April 2025

632-LSS

V1.0

Canada

FOREWORD

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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OVERVIEW

The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Dell VxRail 7.0 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from **Dell Technologies**, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.

Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on **3 April 2025** and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).

1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1: TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	Dell VxRail 7.0
Developer	Dell Technologies

1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.

The TOE claims the following conformance:

EAL 2+ (ALC_FLR.2)

1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION

The TOE is a hyper-converged appliance. Hyper-convergence is a software-defined infrastructure system characterized by tightly integrated compute, storage, networking and virtualization resources. VxRail is based on VMware vSphere and vSAN software and built on Dell PowerEdge hardware. vSAN software defines storage that pools the internal disks of industry standard servers to provide integrated, high speed Virtual Machine storage.

1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:



Figure 1: TOE Architecture

2 SECURITY POLICY

The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:

- Security Audit
- User Data Protection
- Security Management
- Resource Utilization
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.

2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY

The following cryptographic implementation is used by the TOE and has been evaluated by the CAVP:

Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation

Cryptographic Implementation	Certificate Number
VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module V1.0	C1172

3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- The operational environment is responsible for protecting access to the management interfaces.
- Key management will be provided by the operational environment in support of data at rest encryption.
- The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
- There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE. These administrators are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile, are appropriately trained and will follow the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.

3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

The following features are disabled by default and not included in the evaluated configuration:

- SRS VE
- VMCloudware VCF

Direct access to VMware interfaces or individual Virtual Machines is outside the scope of this evaluation.

4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

TOE Software/Firmware	Dell VxRail version 7.0 build 7.0.533
TOE Hardware	E660F, P670F, P670N, S670, V670F
Environmental Support	NTP Server, vCentre Server, Key Management Server, DNS Server

4.1 DOCUMENTATION

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

a) Dell VxRail™ 7.0 Administration Guide, Rev. 22, September 2024
b) Dell VxRail™ Security Configuration Guide, Rev. 13, January 2025
c) Dell VxRail™ API User Guide for 4.5.x, 4.7.x, and 7.0.x, Rev. 22, February 2022
d) Dell VxRail™ 7.0 Common Criteria Guide, Version 1.0, February 2025

5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

5.1 DEVELOPMENT

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.

5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.

6 TESTING ACTIVITIES

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.

6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer's tests;

b. Interoperability Testing: The evaluator tested the trusted channel using a known-good implementation with FIPS-validated cryptography;

c. Node Failure: The evaluator verified that the TOE generates alerts when a node becomes unavailable and that the TOE maintains a secure state after a node failure;

d. Potential Security Violation Enforcement: The evaluator verified that the TOE applies a set of rules for monitoring audit events and based on these rules, indicates a potential security violation;

e. Audit Review: The evaluator verified that logs are accessible via the Linux Shell interface;

f. Audit Log Storage: The evaluator verified that logs are overwritten and rotated; and

g. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator confirmed the claimed cryptographic implementation is present in the TOE.

6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS

The developer's tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.

6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.

- Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
- Technical community sources (Type 2)
- Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
- Tool Generated (Type 4)

The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.

Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on **25 March 2025** and included the following search terms:

TOE name and models (Section 4)	suse linux enterprise server 15 sp4	iDRAC9
Intel Xeon Gold	Vmware vcenter server 7.0 update3	Openssh 8.4p1
Vmware esxi 7.0	Openssl 1.1.1l	Dell PowerEdge
Intel Xeon Silver	Intel Xeon Platinum	

Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:

Dell Technologies Security Advisories, Notices and Resources: https://www.dell.com/support/security/en-us	OpenSSL Vulnerabilites: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities-1.1.1
CISA - Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog	NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search

6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS

The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.

7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Section 1.1. The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS

The TOE is a complex product and should be used only by trained administrators. The evaluator recommends carefully following the guidance to ensure that the product is installed in the evaluated configuration.

8 SUPPORTING CONTENT

8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Definition
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IT	Information Technology
PP	Protection Profile
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SRS VE	Secure Remote Services Virtual Edition
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function
VCF	VMware Cloud Foundation

8.2 REFERENCES

Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Dell VxRail 7.0 Security Target, Version 1.0, February 27, 2025.
Dell Technologies Dell VxRail 7.0 Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, April 3, 2025.